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– July 13 2026 –

The weekend between 10 and 12 July 2026 presents a global geopolitical landscape marked by the progressive repositioning of Western alliances, Russia’s persistent energy vulnerability, and the growing centrality of the maritime domain in power dynamics. The NATO summit in Ankara, the fuel crisis in Moscow, and the stalemate in the Strait of Hormuz form a mosaic where naval, industrial, and diplomatic dimensions intertwine, delineating a phase of strategic transition for the Atlantic Alliance and global energy balances.

Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian refineries, including the Omsk plant, have reduced Moscow’s refining capacity by 25% year-on-year, triggering a 17% collapse in petrol production and shortages across approximately fifty regions of the Federation. Moscow has been forced to import fuel from Belarus, India, and Kazakhstan—the latter remaining cautious for fear of secondary sanctions—while the Jamestown Foundation confirms that the shortage directly impacts the civilian population and the agricultural sector.

An operational paralysis persists in the strait, fueled by seizures, sabotage, and asymmetric threats that have rendered insurance costs unsustainable for shipping companies. Despite this, maritime traffic has recorded an increase thanks to an alternative route along the coast of Oman managed by the US Navy-led Joint Maritime Information Center, although it remains exposed to Iranian missile and drone attacks.

The 36th summit of the Alliance, held on 7–8 July, ratified 80 billion dollars in military aid to Ukraine for 2026 and relaunched Turkey’s role as an industrial pillar. The S-400 dossier has flared up again: Moscow confirmed negotiations with Ankara regarding a potential transfer of the systems to a Gulf country, while Washington evaluates reopening the F-35 programme, sparking concern in Tel Aviv.

Renewed pressure from Donald Trump regarding Greenland has brought the vulnerability of the Arctic flank and Europe’s dependence on US strategic enablers back to the forefront, particularly in satellite reconnaissance and global transport logistics. This development is intertwined with the reduction of US assets in the NATO Force Model (NFM—the operational and strategic framework adopted by the Atlantic Alliance to organise, manage, and deploy member states’ armed forces in times of crisis or conflict), prompting European allies to question their own deterrence autonomy in a quadrant increasingly contested by Russia and China.

In East Asia, the trend towards autonomous missile rearmament is consolidating: South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan are accelerating domestic programmes, reflecting growing distrust in US security guarantees. In parallel, Chinese pressure is expanding beyond the South China Sea towards the Pratas and Taiping islands, with coast guard incursions heightening the risk of incidents.

The Italian group has launched a 600-million-euro plan to acquire four companies specialised in underwater technologies—Next Geosolutions, WSense, Graal Tech, and Defcomm—aiming to become the first vertically integrated underwater operator, with the goal of exceeding 1.1 billion euros in turnover in this segment, thereby strengthening its leadership in safeguarding strategic subsea infrastructure.

The US Navy has launched consultations with Hanwha Ocean, HD Hyundai Heavy Industries, and Samsung Heavy Industries for the construction of destroyers and replenishment oilers, potentially ending an eighty-year-old ban on foreign shipbuilding. Concurrently, naval anti-drone architectures are being redefined, prioritising compact AESA radars and low-cost effectors against swarms of cheap drones.

The essay analyses the growing geopolitical relevance and vulnerability of Critical Undersea Infrastructure (CUI) in the Arctic, an area transformed by climate change and grey-zone rivalries. Accelerated warming and retreating sea ice increase physical risks (seabed instability, ice impacts) and intensify maritime traffic, exposing digital cables and energy pipelines to hybrid, cyber, and geopolitical threats in contexts where damage attribution is complex. Through case studies of Arctic states (from the Icelandic transit hub to Norwegian and Russian dual-use corridors), the authors highlight the need to move beyond traditional surface surveillance. They propose the Seabed-to-Space Situational Awareness (S3A) model, an integrated architecture that fuses data from underwater sensors, satellites, and contextual intelligence. Finally, Arctic resilience demands a systemic approach: adaptive design, robust public-private cooperation, and the full integration of climate sciences into security planning.

The article analyses the extraordinary geopolitical relevance of the Strait of Malacca, defining it as a global commercial artery even more crucial and hazardous than the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, nearly 22 per cent of global maritime trade passes through this channel, making it a genuine “strategic nightmare” for China, which imports as much as 80 per cent of its oil requirements from here. This scenario, historically known as the “Malacca Dilemma”, has been further complicated by India’s recent naval expansion in the nearby Nicobar Islands. Alternative maritime routes through the Indonesian straits of Sunda and Lombok would lengthen voyages by several days, whilst land corridors offer logistically limited solutions. To protect its vital supplies and overcome this vulnerability, Beijing is massively upgrading its Navy, which now outnumbers that of the United States.

The CeSMar article analyses the 36th NATO summit held in Ankara on 7 and 8 July 2026, hailed as the birth of “NATO 3.0”. The meeting took place amid high tensions caused by the progressive US military retrenchment from Europe, the fifth year of war in Ukraine, and the repercussions of the crisis with Iran. The summit’s final declaration confirmed the commitment to Article 5 and announced the allocation of 70 billion dollars for the defence industry, alongside the transfer of 70 billion euros to Kyiv for the 2026–2027 biennium. However, behind the successes declared by Secretary General Mark Rutte, deep internal fractures remain, exacerbated by President Donald Trump’s attacks against allies such as Italy and Spain.

The article analyses the persistent relevance of the twentieth-century geopolitical theories of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman, focused on the antithesis between the “Heartland” (the Eurasian continental core) and the “Rimland” (the peripheral coastal strip). In the contemporary geopolitical context, this theoretical dualism is clearly reflected in the global strategic competition between major powers. The Russian Federation and China, by consolidating their cooperation, attempt to dominate the continental space of the Heartland and extend their influence towards coastal areas. Conversely, the United States and its Western allies adopt a maritime strategy aimed at containing this expansion along the Rimland. This clash between telluric and maritime powers demonstrates how control over Eurasian geographical axes remains the pivot of geopolitical balances and world conflicts.

The Ankara summit confirms a trajectory of progressive “Europeanisation” of NATO, prompted by the selective reduction of US assets assigned to the Force Model. This repositioning does not imply a total American withdrawal, but rather a transfer of responsibility towards Europe and Canada, with Turkey emerging as an indispensable geographical and industrial hub, capable of mediating simultaneously between the West, Russia, and the Gulf on the S-400 dossier. The Russian energy crisis, aggravated by Ukrainian attacks, further weakens Moscow’s negotiating position, forcing it into costly commercial triangulations with Belarus, India, and Kazakhstan, and fueling internal pressures that could impact the Kremlin’s social stability.

On the Middle Eastern front, the Hormuz stalemate consolidates the perception of an Iran capable of exerting asymmetric pressure on the global economy without resorting to a total blockade, while keeping the region in a state of permanent alert. In Asia, growing distrust in US guarantees accelerates strategic autonomy dynamics which, while strengthening regional deterrence against China and North Korea, increase the risk of uncontrolled missile proliferation. Overall, a highly fragmented multipolar system is observed, where traditional alliances are redefined around sectorial interests—energy, dual-use technology, shipbuilding—rather than rigid ideological blocs, with Brussels and Washington struggling to find full regulatory convergence on sensitive technologies.

On the doctrinal level, NATO has revised its rules of engagement in the Baltic, expanding the freedom of action for field commanders in neutralizing unidentified aerial threats—a sign of a more assertive posture towards Russian provocations. The potential unblocking of the F-35 dossier for Turkey, conditional on resolving the S-400 issue, would reshape aerial balances in the Eastern Mediterranean and raises questions about the interoperability and security of Western technologies, leaving Israel particularly exposed to a potential Turkish dual-possession of Russian and US systems.

Germany’s cancellation of the F126 frigate programme signals budgetary constraints that could affect the Bundeswehr’s naval projection, while Spain faces a similar doctrinal crossroads regarding the future of its naval aviation, with the hypothesis of replacing retiring Harriers with unmanned platforms (drones) instead of F-35Bs. In the anti-drone domain, the evolution towards compact AESA sensors and low-cost effectors indicates a structural shift in naval defence doctrine, oriented towards economic sustainability rather than absolute technological superiority. Finally, the reinforcement of the Royal Marines in the High North and the “deterrence laboratory” of the Norwegian Sea confirm that the Arctic and the GIUK gap are becoming priority theatres for multi-domain surveillance.

The Russian refining crisis is producing ripple effects on regional energy markets, with Belarus applying a 60% surcharge on fuel exported to Moscow and India launching sales of refined petrol from plants co-owned by Rosneft. Parallelly, future Western sanctions post-Hormuz crisis will focus on evasion via the shadow fleet and third-party banking intermediaries, in an attempt to erode the Kremlin’s tax revenues further.

On the defence industrial front, the Ankara summit formalised 80 billion dollars in military aid to Ukraine for 2026, replicable in 2027, along with the creation of a Defence, Security, and Resilience Bank promoted by Canada to mobilise concessional loans. Nine EU countries have also requested the Commission’s authorization to finance extra-EU procurement through EU loans, signaling internal tensions over European industrial preference. On the technological front, the dual-use challenge between Brussels and Washington regarding artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and quantum computing remains unresolved, while the shipping sector is gradually abandoning decarbonisation targets in favour of optimised fossil fuels and modular nuclear propulsion. Finally, the devaluation of the Japanese yen, caused by the divergence between Fed and Bank of Japan monetary policies, benefits Japanese exports but aggravates domestic energy costs.

The Strait of Hormuz remains the most critical chokepoint globally: although the opening of a protected two-way route along the Omani coast has allowed a partial resumption of transits, Iranian attacks with fast boats, drones, and missiles continue to hit merchant shipping, keeping insurance costs high. The Red Sea retains similar criticalities due to the persistent Houthi threat along the route to Suez, forcing Western navies into high-intensity missions. In the South China Sea, the extension of Chinese maritime pressure towards Pratas and Taiping widens the front of friction with Taiwan, while the Philippines’ diplomatic stalemate on the new code of conduct leaves the regional regulatory framework unresolved.

The Sea of Azov is becoming a target for tailored Ukrainian strikes against Russian grain export routes, with potential repercussions for global food security. On the industrial-naval plane, the US Navy’s historic move towards South Korean shipyards could break an eighty-year domestic production monopoly, while Fincantieri consolidates its projection in underwater technology through four targeted acquisitions, positioning itself as a vertical operator spanning defence, offshore energy, and civilian markets. The Royal Navy is advancing its trials of extra-large autonomous submarines with the XV Excalibur programme, and Germany has announced a naval laser weapon system developed with MBDA and Rheinmetall, operational from 2029. These developments confirm that sea control, protection of underwater infrastructure, and anti-drone innovation remain inescapable pillars of deterrence, as highlighted by analyses on the persistent strategic value of traditional navies in the drone era.

For Italy, the current situation confirms a dual industrial prominence: on one hand, Fincantieri’s expansion into the underwater sector reinforces national leadership in advanced shipbuilding and the protection of critical Mediterranean infrastructure; on the other, the partnership between Leonardo and Turkey’s Baykar in UAV systems opens a path for extra-EU industrial cooperation that could alleviate the fragmentation of European drone consortia. The GCAP programme, involving Italy, the UK, and Japan for a sixth-generation fighter, receives fresh impetus from the unblocking of British funds, consolidating Italy’s role in European aerospace.

For Greece, the accident involving a Hellenic Air Force F-16 in the western part of the country, with the pilot successfully ejecting, highlights the wear and tear of the national air fleet, engaged in intense airspace surveillance within a tense regional context. For Spain, the retirement of Harriers between 2030 and 2032 poses a significant strategic dilemma: the alternative to an economically burdensome F-35B is an ecosystem of autonomous platforms compatible with the aircraft carrier Juan Carlos I, modeled on Turkey’s TCG Anadolu. More broadly, the entire Southern Mediterranean region remains exposed to the indirect repercussions of the Hormuz stalemate and the Red Sea crisis, which affect the logistical costs of energy routes to Europe, while the dependence on US enablers highlighted by the Greenland affair reminds states of the necessity to invest in naval and aerial strategic autonomy within their direct quadrant of responsibility.

The picture that emerged between 10 and 12 July confirms a phase of structural redefinition of Euro-Atlantic, Middle Eastern, and Indo-Pacific balances, with the maritime dimension serving as the common denominator of major frictions. Three dossiers appear destined for near-term evolution: the Russian-Turkish negotiations on the S-400s, the resolution of which will condition Ankara’s potential readmission to the F-35 programme; the sustainability of the two-month transitional agreement on Hormuz, the outcome of which will determine the short-term stability of global energy flows; and the translation of US-South Korea consultations into executive naval contracts, an event that would mark a historic turning point in the American defence industrial base.

The Russian fuel crisis also merits constant monitoring, as any further aggravation could accelerate internal social tensions within the Federation. For the Centre, it is recommended to prioritise tracking the developments of the Turkish-Russian-American dossier and the evolution of Korean shipbuilding for the US Navy, as these topics have the most immediate impact on global maritime strategy and industrial arrangements of direct interest to Italy.

This summary has been prepared based on articles from various geopolitical and strategic analysis sources, including: Center for Maritime Strategy, CIMSEC, Reuters, ShipMag, Navy Lookout, National Interest, Seapower Magazine, CSIS, RUSI, War on the Rocks, IISS, Responsible Statecraft, Foreign Affairs, Formiche.net, Il Sussidiario, Start Magazine, InsideOver, Notizie Geopolitiche, IARI, Dissipatio, Analisi Difesa, Jamestown Foundation, Atlantic Council, RAND Corporation.

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The contributions are the direct responsibility of the editorial staff and reflect their views. Total or partial reproduction is authorized provided that the source is cited.

The structuring and interpretation of the data are the result of a synthesis process aimed at creating a coherent and organic analytical framework. The summary does not represent an original analysis, but rather a structured reorganization of the information collected and selected based on the expertise of our scholars, who then extrapolated the consequences in the geopolitical, strategic, maritime, and Italy-related fields